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Implication of a Covenant To
Diligently Develop and Mine In Hard
Mineral Leases That Provide for
Minimum Rents or Royalties
INTRODUCTION
A covenant to diligently develop and mine is almost univer-
sally implied at law in hard mineral' leases when the sole con-
sideration for the lease is production royalties2 and the lease is
silent on the issue of development.' In a lease of this type, the
Hard minerals in this context include any stationary solid "natural constituent
of the crust of the earth, inorganic or fossil" that can be dug, quarried, strip mined, or
deep mined. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (5th ed. 1979). Oil, gas and other migratory
liquid or gaseous minerals are not classified as hard minerals. Due to the migratory
nature of oil and gas, reserves contained beneath a surface estate may be depleted by
wells on adjacent properties. Solid minerals are stationary and cannot be drawn from
the estate in which they are contained by operations on adjacent tracts.
2 Production royalties are consideration paid for the rights to explore, mine, and
extract minerals. Production royalties are paid on a unit basis (commonly per ton of
mineral or ore) as the mineral is extracted or shipped. The payments accumulate for
some specific period (e.g., month, quarter) before they are paid to the lessor. If no
mining occurs during the period, the lessor does not receive any production royalties.
Thus, income from lease of the property is directly related to the tonnage of the mineral
mined during the period and the unit royalty rate, which is often linked to sale price.
' Mendota Coal and Coke Co. v. Eastern Ry. and Lumber Co., 53 F.2d 77 (9th
Cir. 1931); Carter v. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Iowa 1952);
Adkins v. Adams, 54 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ill. 1944); In re Sixteen to One Mining Corp.,
9 Bankr. 639 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Co., 18 P.2d 649
(Ariz. 1933); Zappia v. Garner, 536 S.W.2d 714 (Ark. 1976); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co.
v. Clayton Coal Co., 134 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1943); Higginbottom v. Thiele Kaolin Co.,
304 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 1983); Archer v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 642 P.2d 943 (Idaho
1982); Owens v. Waggoner, 55 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. App. 1944); Smith v. White, 411 So.2d
731 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Garden Park Homes Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 507
S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1974); George v. Jones, 95 N.W.2d 609 (Neb. 1959); lonno v. Glen-
Gery Corp., 443 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1983); Bennett v. Hebener, 643 P.2d 393 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982); Hummel v. McFadden, 150 A.2d 856 (Pa. 1959); Reed v. Consolidated
Feldspar Corp., 23 N.W. 2d 154 (S.D. 1946); Tennessee Valley Kaolin Corp. v. Perry,
526 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974); Cleghorn v. Dallas Power and Light Co., 611
S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981); Home Creek Smokeless
Coal Co. v. Combs, 132 S.E.2d 399 (Va. 1963); lafolla v. Douglas Pocahontas Coal
Corp., 250 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1978); Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Federal-Radorock Gas
Hills Partners, 407 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1965).
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lessor only receives compensation when the minerals are ex-
tracted from the earth. Therefore, courts assume that the parties
contracted with the understanding that the minerals would be
mined within a reasonable time of lease execution. Jurisdictions
differ, however, on whether an obligation to prudently develop4
the leasehold should be implied where the terms of the lease
provide for minimum royalties or rents5 as well as production
royalties. 6 Since minimum royalties compensate the lessor when
little or no production is occurring, the unexpressed intentions
of the parties concerning the rate of development are not as easy
to construe as when only production royalties are provided for
in the lease. Courts commonly examine the nature and adequacy
of the minimum royalties as well as other circumstances sur-
The primary components of "prudent" or "diligent" development are the
obligations to explore the property and develop the minerals within a reasonable time
when found in paying quantities. Mendota Coal, 53 F.2d at 80; Taylor, 18 P.2d at 651-
52; Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 134 P.2d at 1067; George, 95 N.W.2d at 616; Exxon
Co. v. Dalco Oil Co., 609 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). When a lessee is under
an implied or express obligation to diligently develop a mineral lease (regardless of the
type of mineral), the court evaluates the lessee's activities to ascertain if the requisite
standard of diligence is achieved. Virtually all courts apply a "prudent operator"
standard which requires the lessee to proceed as "would be reasonably expected of
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and [itself]."
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905). The standard of ordinary
prudence, however, depends on the type of mineral to be extracted (i.e., oil and gas,
limestone, coal, uranium).
To determine if this standard has been achieved, courts usually look at all the
surrounding circumstances including technical, economic, and labor factors. Hummel,
150 A.2d at 863. The courts in Mendota Coal examined: (1) the method of operation
to determine if efficient planning and modern equipment were employed; (2) sales efforts
conducted by the company to see if it was competing effectively with nearby mines; (3)
the market conditions for the seam being mined; (4) productivity of comparable nearby
mines. Mendota Coal, 53 F.2d at 81-83. Often expert witnesses in the mining profession
are relied upon in making these determinations, which are ultimately questions of fact.
See Exxon Co., 609 S.W.2d at 285 (The presence of uranium in paying quantities is
ascertainable by many technical and expert evaluations recognized in the industry.).
Minimum royalties and rents are periodic payments specified within the lease
that insure the lessor a certain minimum income each month or year. Usually, minimum
rents and royalties are not paid when royalties from production exceed the established
minimum (i.e., they are recoupable against production royalties). Advance minimum
royalties are paid to the lessor at the beginning of the period. Minimum royalties are
often only recoupable against production royalties paid for the same period. Sometimes
minimums received by the lessor are recoupable against production royalties from any
future period. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, § 131.06[41, at 131-27 (2d ed.
1984).
See, e.g., infra notes 38 and 68 and accompanying text.
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rounding the lease, such as its term, in determining whether a
covenant to develop should be implied.
7
Many jurisdictions8 use the "substantial relation" test or a
similar analysis to determine whether the minimum royalty pay-
ments preclude implication of a development covenant. This
approach centers on ascertaining the original parties' expecta-
tions concerning the possibility of mining delays. 9 In jurisdictions
applying this test, all circumstances are taken into account to
fairly determine whether the minimum royalties were intended
as consideration for the right to delay development. 10
At the other extreme is Kentucky's "demand for develop-
ment rule." Under this rule, an implied covenant to develop the
hard mineral lease is imposed on the lessee after a "development
demand" is received from the lessor.' As long as the lease is
silent on development, the rule is apparently invoked regardless
of the magnitude or type of minimum royalty.
12
Mining and land holding companies currently possess many
leases which provide for minimum royalties yet are silent on the
issue of development rates.' 3 These leases are under threat of
forfeiture 4 in most if not all jurisdictions if the lessor brings
See, e.g., infra note 38.
See, e.g., infra note 38.
See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78 and 79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
Interview with Max Barret, Jr., Mineral Attorney with Stoll, Keenon & Park,
in Lexington, Ky. (June 9, 1986) [hereinafter Barret Interview].
14 Forfeiture is a possible remedy but is not favored at law. Many jurisdictions
will only permit a lease to be forfeited if the instrument expressly provides for such
relief or if equity absolutely requires forfeiture under the circumstances. The current
trend requires a lessor to prove the inadequacy of monetary damages prior to the
enforcement of a forfeiture clause. Often, the lessee is given a grace period in which to
abate the breach to avoid forfeiture. Before a court will decree a forfeiture a lessor must
ordinarily give the lessee notice of the breach and of lessor's intention to cancel the
lease unless development is commenced immediately. A lessor may waive its right to a
forfeiture by continuing to accept minimum royalties or by failing to complain in a
timely manner. Due to these variations, state case law must be examined to determine
the mechanics of forfeiture enforcement in a particular jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re
Sixteen to One, 9 Bankr. at 639 (acceptance of minimum royalties estops lessor from
enforcing forfeiture for failure to remove minerals); lonno, 443 N.E.2d at 508 (lessor
must show damages to be inadequate); Cleghorn, 611 S.W.2d at 897 (forfeiture should
only be decreed under extraordinary circumstances and the lessee should be given
opportunity to correct breach before forfeiture is declared); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
19861
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suit for breach of an implied development covenant. Before
corrective steps can be taken by the lessee to reduce the danger, II
the lessee's lawyer must be aware of how courts in the respective
states construe leases of this type. This knowledge is also essen-
tial to both lessor and lessee in negotiating and drafting new
leases. 16
This Comment examines the status of the implied covenant
to develop in hard mineral leases which contain minimum royalty
provisions. The first section discusses the rationale for the im-
plied development covenant, restrictions on its use, and scenarios
under which mining delays occur. The following sections delin-
eate the rules of construction and interpretative tests used in
various mining jurisdictions. The final part of this Comment
analyzes the logic of these tests in light of the regulatory and
economic climate of today's mining industry.
I. RATIONALE FOR THE IMPLIED COVENANT To
DILIGENTLY DEVELOP
When parties do not expressly address their expectations
concerning development within a mineral lease, courts must try
to discern the parties' original intentions' 7 if a dispute arises
Shonk Land Co., 288 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1982) (no forfeiture if monetary damages are
a sufficient remedy); lafolla, 250 S.E.2d at 135 (notice requirement for forfeiture not
met); Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984) (when lease requires notice to be
given for defaults, the notice must identify the breach and state that failure to cure may
lead to forfeiture). But see Russell v. Johns Manville Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 634 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971) (forfeiture enforced for breach of covenant to mine diligently despite
lack of forfeiture provision). See generally Note, Forfeiture: General State of the Law
and Movement to Further Confine Its Application in the Coal Lease, 86 W. VA. L.
REV. 1039 (1984); 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW AND REGULATION § 81.06(3], at 81-50 (1984).
' The risk of forfeiture or damages due to breach of an implied development
covenant can be reduced or eliminated by: (1) initiating some development activities
such as permitting and engineering, or exploration; or (2) renegotiating the lease to
include a provision for delaying development supported by reasonable minimum royal-
ties. Barret Interview, supra note 13.
11 To avoid potential conflicts concerning mining delays, the lease being drafted
should contain: (I) provisions delineating development expectations including all circum-
stances under which development can be delayed and quantification of the maximum
non-mining period; (2) reasonable minimum royalty or rental terms which expressly state
that they are consideration for the right to delay development; and (3) a stipulation that
minimum royalties cannot be offset against production royalties earned in future periods.
Barret Interview, supra note 13.
" 4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 130.04, at 130-9; Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf
and W. Indus., 756 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1985) (finder of fact to determine intent of
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concerning the method or rate'8 of development. Judges seldom
imply terms into a lease that is silent on an issue and will only
do so when a term is "so clearly in the contemplation of the
parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it, or that it
is necessary to imply such covenant in order to give effect to
the purpose of the contract as a whole."' 9
Where the sole consideration to the lessor for executing a
lease is production royalties from mining, virtually all jurisdic-
tions infer that the parties intended development to proceed in
a timely manner.20 Covenants to develop have also been implied
on the theory that public policy is opposed to hindering devel-
opment of valuable mineral properties.2' Another basis for the
implication is that it is unjust to tie up a property so that the
lessor is deprived of the opportunity to work the mine himself,
or permit others to do SO.
2 2
Generally, a covenant is not implied into the lease when the
expectations concerning development are delineated within the
parties); Smith v. Long, 578 P.2d 232, 234 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) ("One of the best
methods of determining the true intent of the parties is their behavior and interpretation
of the contract before controversy arises.").
, Often, several different mining methods or techniques can be used to extract
the mineral. See generally SME MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK (I. Given ed. 1973).
For example, coal reserves on a tract may be amenable to extraction by mountaintop
removal, contour strip, or traditional room and pillar deep mining. The type of methods
used and the scale of the operation determine production rates and the expected per-
centage of reserve recovery. If a lessee chooses a method which results in a low
production or recovery rate when more productive alternatives are available, the lessor
might claim that the operator is not proceeding diligently. The same claim is also made
when the operator does not conduct any development or mining activities. If the lease
clearly addresses the type of mining to be used, requires the lessee to produce a certain
quantity of minerals per year, or establishes other development goals on time frames,
then the diligence standard is set by those development terms and no intention inquiry
is required. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
11 Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 6 S.W.2d 1039, 1041-
42 (Tex. 1928); see also Carter v. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., 200 F.2d 754, 756 (8th
Cir. 1953); Weatherly v. American Agricultural Chem. Co., 65 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1933); Grass v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 84 S.E. 750 (W. Va. 1915).
"" Taylor, 18 P.2d at 651 ("no sane man would execute such a lease unless he
believed the lessee would at least make a reasonable effort to develop the premises...").
21 Reynolds v. White Plain Oil and Gas Co., 250 S.W. 975, 976 (Ky. 1923) ("such
lease contracts are a hindrance to the progress of the state, and therefore against public
policy... "); lonno, 443 N.E.2d at 507. Today, however, courts seem to rely more on
the unexpressed intentions of the parties. See supra note 3. See generally Note, Aban-
donment and Forfeiture of Coal Leases in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L. J. 217 (1982-83).
22 Conrad v. Morehead, 89 N.C. 31, 35 (N.C. 1883).
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instrument. 23 Implication of a term into the contract "can only
be justified when the implied term is not inconsistent with some
express term of the contract.12 4 Where terms concerning devel-
opment are spelled out in the lease, a "court will not use the
vehicle of interpretation to relieve one party of a bad bargain." '25
In the absence of latent or patent ambiguities, a judge has no
reason to presume that the intentions of the parties are other
than those actually stated in an express development provision.
Although terms which clearly set out the manner and schedule
for development always rule,26 ambiguous or blanket waiver
provisions may not always negate an implied covenant to de-
velop, 27 especially where a production royalty is the sole consid-
eration for leasing the mineral rights.
Courts are often faced with the duty of ascertaining the
development expectations of the parties under a lease which is
silent on development responsibilities but provides for the pay-
ment of minimum royalties. 28 In this situation, an intention that
the property will be diligently developed may not have been
within the contemplation of the parties.2 9 If granting the lease
.' Warm Springs Dev. Co. v. McAulay, 576 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Nev. 1978) (implying
a covenant when the parties have specifically addressed the issue is "violative of all
settled interpretation and construction of contracts, and an unjustifiable interference
with the privilege and power to contract") (quoting 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS, § 397, at
547 (1959)); Dallas Power and Light Co. v. Cleghorn, 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981); 4
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, § 130.04, at 130-10 ("When terms in the mining instrument
are clear, courts will not read words into the document so as to create an intent not
expressed .. ").
2' Higginbottom v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 304 S.E.2d 365, 366 (citing WILLISTON,
WILISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1295 (3rd ed.)).
-' lafolla, 250 S.E.2d at 131 (quoting Pechenik v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co.,
205 S.E.2d 813, 815 (W. Va. 1974)); see also Weatherly, 65 S.W.2d at 598 (an express
provision cannot be ignored in the interest of being fair to one party); Holley v. Federal
Am. Partners, 507 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah 1973) ("Just how the parties fare under the
contract is not the concern of the courts .....
" See supra note 23.
" See Cleghorn v. Dallas Power and Light Co., 611 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Tex.
Civ. App.), rev'd, 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981) (The appellate court found that a clause
stipulating that the lease would remain active as long as minimums were paid did not
authorize unreasonable delay; the Texas Supreme Court reversed and upheld the express
term.); see also Browning v. Mountain States Coal Corp., 338 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1960);
Fremont Lumber Co. v. Starrell Petroleum Co., 364 P.2d 773 (Or. 1961).
" See infra note 38.
21 When, however, a lease only provides for production royalties and does not
expressly establish development standards, courts always infer that development within
a reasonable time was contemplated by both parties. See supra note 3.
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was completely contingent upon expeditious development of the
mineral estate, it seems unlikely that the parties would insert
royalty provisions that guarantee an income to the lessor when
little or no production takes place. Nevertheless, a minimum
royalty provision could arguably be intended to compensate the
lessor only during exploration, inital development, or non-pro-
duction periods caused by strikes or other force majeure situa-
tions.
Mine development may be delayed intentionally or for rea-
sons beyond the operator's control. These possible causes of
delay further illustrate the difficulty of interpreting original ex-
pectations when the lease is ambiguous as to development. A
lessee may delay development of the property: (1) to speculate
that the market demand for the mineral will increase;30 (2) be-
cause profitable development and operation is not possible under
existing conditions;3' (3) to secure additional properties necessary
for proper mine development;3 2 (4) because ongoing operations
are fulfilling current orders or are tying up all available equip-
"' If the demand for the mineral increases significantly, the lessee may in some
instances sublease the property to another company for a cash bonus plus an overriding
production royalty. Thus, the lessee could make a substantial profit without ever devel-
oping the property and often without incurring expenses. More commonly, a lessee
speculates for a market increase to make a greater net profit on mining. Barret Interview,
supra note 13. Courts seem to abhor speculation which delays development for an
unreasonable period. See Reynolds, 250 S.W. at 976; lonno, 443 N.E.2d at 508.
" What is economical today may not be tomorrow. One of the most important
factors affecting the viability of a mining venture is market demand. Coal companies
that sell a high percentage of coal on the spot market are very susceptible to changes in
demand. A one or two dollar drop in the spot market for a particular quality coal is
sufficient to adversely change the economic feasiblity of potential ventures.
A potentially profitable reserve to one company may be beyond the economic
mining capabilities of another. For example, a company with a higher paying contract
can afford to deep mine slightly thinner or harder to work coal seams or surface mine
to a higher overburden to coal ratio than a company with a less attractive market. Other
factors such as union labor, economies of scale, and transportation also affect a
company's cost of operation. Evaluating the economics of a large mining venture requires
predicting such future variables as interest rates, inflation, market demand, and mine
productivities. Interview with Scott Smith, Vice President of McCoy & McCoy Environ-
mental Consultants, in Lexington, Ky. (April 4, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Smith Inter-
view).
'2 Often a lessor's property will only comprise a small percentage of the total area
proposed to be mined by a single operation. A mining company is prudent to secure all
required leases before expending much capital on development. This is especially true
for metal mines which require a large reserve base to be economically viable. Barret
Interview, supra note 13.
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ment;"1 or (5) because environmental or safety concerns hinder
the procurement of mining permits.14 Possibly, the lessor is
aware that development may be delayed for one of these reasons.
Alternatively, the lessor may be ignorant of any reason for
delays.35 Although a lessor usually has no control over the actual
rate of development beyond terms provided for in the lease, it
may also desire that production be delayed.36 The reason for a
delay, where it can be ascertained by the court, may play a
major role in determining whether the delay in development is
excusable at law.
37
" A large coal mining company often has more than twenty on-going operations
within a state. These companies must constantly search for and secure additional leases
to be developed as on-going operations are mined-out. If the spot market is weak, a
company does not mine much coal beyond that needed to fill existing contract orders.
Consequently, development of some reserves is delayed until a spread of equipment
becomes available from another operation. With mining equipment prices approaching
one million dollars for a single twelve to fifteen yard end-loader, economics usually do
not justify the purchase or even leasing of additional equipment every time a new lease
is procured. Barret Interview, supra note 13.
' The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter cited as
SMCRAJ, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp.
1982)) imposed extensive permitting requirements and performance standards on the
mining industry, focusing particularly on coal mining. Under SMCRA, obtaining a coal
mining permit will usually take at least a year due to monitoring, sampling, and
engineering requirements. If environmental or public safety concerns exist, procuring a
permit can take much longer. Also, SMCRA provides for a process through which
certain critical areas may be designated as "unsuitable for mining." Id. § 522, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1272.
" The lessor is often unaware of all the permitting and engineering tasks that the
mining company must perform. In some states, pre-mine water monitoring must be
conducted for six months before a permit can be issued for a coal operation. The lessee's
efforts to secure a market for the mine's production are also not commonly known to
the lessor. Smith Interview, supra note 31.
11 A lessor may desire production to be delayed when royalties are based on a
percent of the market price if it speculates prices may increase. Also, delaying or reducing
production may be advantageous from a tax standpoint to spread out taxable income
over a longer period. Like lessees, mineral lessors are frequently large corporations with
intricate tax policies. See generally ARTHUR ANDERSON & Co., THE BusiNESS OF COAL
ch. 3 (1981).
11 Williams v. Vesley, 434 A.2d 196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (operator excused from
development duties because of regulatory permitting delays beyond his control). Courts
are divided on whether the lessee breached its covenant to diligently develop the property
when commencing an operation appears uneconomical. Absent an express development
provision, many courts do not require a lessee to commence development if it would
not be profitable. Mendota Coal , 53 F.2d at 81 ("No obligation rests on [the lessee]
to carry the operations beyond the point where they will be profitable to him, even if
some benefit to the lessor will result from them.") (quoting Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
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II. CURRENT TRENDS UNDER LEASES PROVIDING FOR
MiNIMUM ROYALTIES
In the absence of express development provisions, many
jurisdictions hold that payment of a minimum royalty or rent
precludes the implication of a covenant to diligently develop and
mine the property under certain circumstances.38 The tests ap-
plied by the courts differ, but the nature of the periodic royalty
or rent appears to be the most important factor in determining
whether the covenant is implied. 9 By examining the nature of
the payments in light of other terms of the lease, courts attempt
to discern the intentions and expectations of both parties relative
to the timeliness of development.40
A. The Substantial Relation Test
A popular approach is to examine the adequacy of the
minimum royalty or rent in comparison with the lessor's ex-
pected income from production royalties. 4' If the minimum roy-
Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905)); see also Hummel, 150 A.2d at 863. The profitability
of development and mining should be considered in any evaluation of a lessee's prudence
because a reasonable operator would not develop a mine when to do so would result in
an economic loss. Requiring an operator to be prudent in the technical manner of its
workings but not allowing it to use reasonable economic discretion before commencing
operation is inconsistent. Yet a few courts still impose an obligation upon a lessee to
develop within a reasonable time even when mining would be unprofitable. Home Creek,
132 S.E.2d at 406 (right to delay development when mining is unprofitable must be
clearly stipulated in a lease which only provides for production royalties); Clintwood
Coal Corp. v. Turner, 114 S.E. 177 (Va. 1922). Note, however, that poor market
conditions never relieve the lessee of the obligation to pay minimum royalties specified
within the lease. Walter Bledsoe & Co. v. Elkhorn Land Co., 219 F.2d 556, 559 (6th
Cir. 1955).
3 Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf and W. Indus., 756 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1985)
(applying Virginia law); Smith v. Long, 578 P.2d 232 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); Higgin-
bottom, 304 S.E.2d at 366; Archer, 642 P.2d at 949; L.E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549
S.W.2d 837 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Carroll v. Eaton, 541 P.2d 64 (Mont. 1975); Olson v.
Pedersen, 231 N.W.2d 310 (Neb. 1975); Hummel, 150 A.2d at 860; Perry. 526 S.W.2d
at 491; lafolla, 250 S.E.2d at 130; May v. Shields, 393 P.2d 319 (Wyo. 1964).
'" 4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 131.09[5][c], at 131-47; see, e.g., Higginbottom,
304 S.E.2d at 367; Archer, 642 P.2d at 948.
See supra note 17.
Smith, 578 P.2d at 235; Archer, 642 P.2d at 948; L. E. Cooke Corp., 549
S.W.2d at 838; Perry, 526 S.W.2d at 491; Vitro Minerals Corp. v. Shoni Uranium
Corp., 386 P.2d 938, 942-43 (Wyo. 1963). See generally Note, The Implied-in-Law
Covenant to Develop and Mine in Hard Mineral Leases: Archer v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 19 IDAHO L. REV. 633 (1983).
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alties stipulated in a lease are "reasonably substantial in relation
to the anticipated return from the property, they are in effect
an agreed compensation to the lessor for the lessee's failure to
achieve reasonable production." 42 A covenant to develop is im-
plied, however, if the annual rental is only nominal or small in
relation to potential production royalties.
4
1
Jurisdictions applying this "substantial relation" test exam-
ine several factors to determine the sufficiency of the periodic
royalties or rents. In Archer v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.," the
Supreme Court of Idaho compared the periodic payments to the
lessor's original acquisition price. The Court found the upfront
and minimum royalties were substantial consideration since the
lessor had already realized a return of over 18 times its invest-
ment. 4 A lump sum upfront payment also is held as sufficient
consideration for the right to delay development." The overall
effect of the minimum payments is the chief concern of the
courts.47 Whether the implied obligation to mine is waived by
acceptance of minimum royalties or "whether the minimum
annual payments are considered as agreed to liquidated damages
for an ongoing contract is merely a play on words. ' 48 The key
question is whether the upfront or periodic payments are suffi-
ciently substantial in relation to the expected profits from pro-
duction royalties to show that the lessor anticipated production
delays. 49 If the payments are found sufficiently substantial, the
right to delay development is held to be supported by consider-
ation.A0
In addition to contract law justifications, equity may also
influence the decision to refuse to imply a development covenant
12 Dulin v. West, 528 P.2d 411, 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
41 Id. (court found that an annual rental of only $10 was not substantial enough
to preclude a duty to diligently develop).
642 P.2d at 948.
The court, however, did not decide whether a duty to develop would be implied
"if the non-royalty consideration was miniscule." Id.
Smith, 578 P.2d at 235; Vitro Mineral Corp., 386 P.2d at 942-43. Compare
Taylor v. Kingsman Feldspar Co., 18 P.2d 649, 651 (Ariz. 1933) (The substantial upfront
royalty was expressly stated to be recoupable from future production royalties; thus,
there was no independent consideration to support delay in development.).
47 Perry, 546 S.W.2d at 491.
" Id.
Id.
"Dulin, 528 P.2d at 412.
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into a lease supported by substantial minimum royalties. The
Court in Archer took note that imposing a duty to develop
would result in a windfall to the lessor since he would have
received $183,000 in rentals while still retaining all the minerals.5
Interestingly, equitable principles are also relied on by some
courts to impose an obligation to diligently develop where pro-
duction royalties are the lessor's only consideration.52
B. Tests Based on Form of Minimum Royalty
In some jurisdictions, the test to ascertain whether minimum
royalties or rents preclude implication of a development covenant
is based on whether the periodic payments are separate and
substantial in relation to the production royalty.5 3 When a min-
imum periodic rental could only be credited toward production
royalties for the period in which the minimum royalties were
paid,54 the Georgia Supreme Court found no implied duty to
mine.55 The parties' provision for such an annual rental "indi-
cates that they knew that mining might not occur for some time
and intended that in that event the rental would be sufficient
consideration. 5 6 Conversely, if the minimum rentals provided
for in the lease can all be credited against future production
royalties, the Court imposes a duty to develop within a reason-
able time.5 7 In any event, all circumstances and facts are usually
Archer, 642 P.2d at 947, n.5.
See supra note 22. Notions of fairness seem to influence court decisions when
the expectations of the parties concerning development must be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
" Brooks v. Freeport Kaolin Co., 324 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1985); Higginbotom, 304
S.E.2d at 367; see also Archer, 642 P.2d at 948 (The court distinguished advances on
future production royalties from independent substantial consideration in determining
that no obligation to develop existed.).
" For example, if a $10,000/year advance minimum royalty is specified and
royalties from production exeed $10,000 in that year, the entire advance minimum royalty
is credited toward the production royalties due. However, if production royalties only
equal $4,000 for the year, the $6,000 of minimum royalties that exceeded production
royalties cannot be credited against any excess production royalties in future years.
Therefore, the $6,000 appears to be more of a separate consideration supporting the
lessee's right to delay production.
Higginbozlom, 304 S.E.2d at 367.
Id.; see also Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Allison Engineering Co., 421 A.2d 281,
284 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (In Pennsylvania, minimum royalties are considered a penalty
or liquidated rental for not mining.).
" See supra note 53.
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examined before making a final determination of the parties'
development expectations.
8
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, a
covenant to diligently develop coal and clay leases was implied
where the minimum royalty was credited against all future pro-
duction royalties.5 9 The Court did not question the adequacy of
the payments but based its decision on the lease requirement
that all minimum royalties be offset against production royalties.
Under this type of recoupment provision, the "real consideration
for the lease is the expected return derived from the actual
mining of the land."w6 In dicta, the court emphasizes that this
type of royalty provision is clearly different from a non-refund-




Generally courts only imply a duty to prudently develop into
a hard mineral lease with minimum royalty payments when the
periodic payment is considered insufficient or token
consideration 62 or all minimum royalty payments are credited
entirely against future production royalties. 63 Several courts,
however, do not appear to consider the sufficiency or type of
minimum royalty if the lease provides that the lessee is obligated
to produce "or" pay delay rentals. 4 Under a lease where the
lessee has the express option of exploiting the minerals or paying
a minimal rental, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia held the lease "valid and enforceable in the absence of
fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, or failure of consideration
and [it] may not be unilaterally cancelled by the lessor. ' 65 The
Court's rationale for not imposing a duty to develop in an "or"
Higginbottom, 304 S.E.2d at 368.
lonno, 443 N.E.2d at 507.
Id.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 41.
See supra note 53; lonno, 443 N.E.2d at 507.
756 F.2d at 450; In re Sixteen to One, 9 Bankr. 639; Carroll, 541 P.2d at 66;
Olson, 231 N.W.2d at 315; lafolla, 250 S.E.2d at 131; Beech Fork Coal Co. v.
Pocahontas Corp., 152 S.E. 785 (W.Va. 1930); May, 393 P.2d at 324.
6' lafolla, 250 S.E.2d at 130.
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type lease is that intentions of parties as expressed in the lea~e
should not be judicially altered. 66 Although specific development
expectations are not delineated in the instrument, the optional
payment language is interpreted as a shorthand expression that
development delays were contemplated by the parties.
61
A few courts have implied development covenants into leases
without discussing the effect of the existing minimum royalty
provisions. 6  In these cases, the courts held that the primary
inducement for executing the leases was the expectation of pro-
duction royalties. 69 The low magnitude of the rentals, however,
may have been an undisclosed factor in the decision.70
The character of other lease provisions may control a court's
decision as to whether to imply a covenant to develop, especially
where the terms seem grossly unfair to one party.7' A modest
minimum rent, when coupled with a long primary term, is more
easily construed as insufficient consideration to delay develop-
ment than when coupled with a short primary term. 72 Texas
courts recently considered whether a covenant to develop within
a reasonable time is implied under lignite leases of unlimited
duration. 73 In these cases, the "no-term" leases expressly provide
Id. at 131. The use of the word "or" creates an express option to mine or to
instead pay minimum royalties. Therefore, a lease of this type is considered to contain
an express provision which grants the lessee the right to delay development for the
primary term of the lease, conditional on the payment of the minimum royalty (which
may be nominal). Other leases that provide for minimum royalties may not clearly state
that the minimums may be paid in lieu of production; consequently, the intentions of
the parties to allow delay in development may not be clear.
I' d.; see supra note 64.
Garden Park Homes Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 507 S.W.2d 368 (Mo.
1974); Yeadon v. Graham, 540 P.2d 1007 (Or. 1975).
" Garden Park, 507 S.W.2d at 374 (indicating that the real consideration for the
lease was the production royalty and not a minimum royalty which was promised
subsequent to execution of the lease); Yeadon, 540 P.2d at 1008 (stating the lessor would
not tie up their property for only $10 per year).
", Yeadon, 540 P.2d at 1008. In effect, the courts appear to be applying a
substantial payment type test to ascertain the parties' intent.
, 4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, § 130.04, at 130-10.
'- Contra Higginbottom, 304 S.E.2d at 368 (The long term of the leases - 50 years
- indicates that the parties knew the lessee would use discretion in determining when to
initiate mining.); but see Mendota Coal, 53 F.2d at 80 (The long term of the lease - 99
years - does not make a five year delay any less important to the lessor).
" Cleghorn v. Dallas Power and Light Co., 611 S.W.2d 893, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.)
rev'd, 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981); Weed v. Brazos-Electric Power Coop., 574 S.W.2d
570, 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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that the leases remain active so long as delay rentals are paid
and no forfeiture will result from failure to develop.74 The Texas
appellate courts found that a "no term" lease does not authorize
unreasonable delay in mining, because the lessor is conceivably
precluded from ever receiving the expected production royalties
merely by paying the delay rentals forever. 7 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the appellate decision in Cleghorn v. Dallas Power
and Light Co. on the basis that courts cannot imply terms
contrary to the express terms of a mineral lease. 6
D. The Kentucky Demand For Development Rule
Generally, Kentucky courts do not impose an implied obli-
gation to mine diligently where the mineral lease provides for
reasonable minimum royalties.7 7 The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, however, has recently adopted the "demand for develop-
ment rule" under which an implied obligation to mine a hard
mineral lease is imposed on a lessee after notice to commence
development by the lessor.78 This rule, which was originally
applied to oil and gas leases, provides that the lessor may:
11 Cleghorn, 611 S.W.2d at 894, revd, 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981); Weed, 574
S.W.2d at 572.
" Id. at 896-97.
7 Cleghorn, 623 S.W.2d at 311.
71 L. E. Cooke Corp., 549 S.W.2d at 839; Continental Fuel Co. v. Haden, 206
S.W. 8 (Ky. 1918); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
7 L. E. Cooke Corp., 549 S.W.2d at 839; see also H. B. Stanley, Inc. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., No. 82-0050 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 1985). In H. B. Stanley, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting in diversity, noted that the
Kentucky Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of whether the demand for
development rule applies to hard mineral leases that provide for substantial minimum
royalties. Kentucky's highest court, however, has upheld the rule as it applies to oil and
gas leases. Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 394
S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965) (after remand). Although the District Court in H. B. Stanley,
Inc. found much merit in the lessee's arguments that the rule should not be applied to
stationary minerals, the court felt bound under the "Erie Doctrine" to follow the
Kentucky Court of Appeals holding in L. E. Cooke Corp..
At the time of this writing, the parties in H. B. Stanley, Inc. have reached a
settlement and are seeking to have the judgment (and memorandum decision) vacated
by the District Court under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(B). The lessee, Vulcan Materials Co.,
had previously filed a notice of appeal with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Sixth Circuit has now remanded the action back to the District Court for its ultimate
decision. When the rule 60(b) motion is granted, the effect will be to render the original
decision null and void. The District Court's analysis, however, could potentially be
applied under similar circumstances by any court applying Kentucky law because the
underlying basis of the decision is L.E. Cooke Corp..
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give notice to the lessee that he will not accept the annual
rentals and permit his land to remain idle and undeveloped,
but will require the lessee to execute the contract according to
the intention in the minds of the parties at the time it was
made by commencing in good faith its development, and, if
the lessee does not, within a year from the notice, in good
faith commence a well on the premises, the lessor at the
expiration of that time may have the lease forfeited.79
The original rule as it applied to oil and gas was primarily
based on the minerals' migratory nature.80 The rule enabled a
lessor to demand development to offset exhaustion of reserves
by adjacent wells on other leaseholds. 8' This demand for devel-
opment rule has now been applied to coal 82 and could potentially
be applied to other hard mineral leases83 which do not contain
express development provisions. The Kentucky courts, however,
have not offered justification for applying the rule to hard
mineral leases. Possibly, the rationalization is based on a public
policy concern to prevent natural resources from lying idle.
84
Effectively, the demand for development rule can impose a duty
to commence development on the lessee regardless of the sub-
stantial nature of the minimum royalties or the economic via-
bility of the mining operation.
85
III. ANALYSIS: "SUBSTANTIAL RELATION TEST"
Most courts hold that in the absence of fraud or misrepre-
" Monarch Oil, Gas, and Coal Co. v. Richardson, 99 S.W. 668 (Ky. 1907).
" Id.; see also Cameron, 338 S.W.2d 399, rev'd on other grounds, 394 S.W.2d
773 (Ky. 1965) (after remand).
Id. For a thorough discussion of the origin of the implied covenant to develop
in both hard minerals and oil and gas, see generally Note, The Implied Covenant to
Reasonably Develop: Should Hard-Mineral Applications Follow Oil and Gas Precedent?,
20 Hous. L. REV. 883 (1983).
'2 L. E. Cooke Corp., 549 S.W.2d at 838. Although the demand for development
rule was mentioned in Mendota Coal, 53 F.2d at 80 (dicta), Kentucky appears to be
unique in its application of the rule to hard minerals at this time.
H. B. Stanley, Inc., No. 82-0050 at I (applying rule to limestone leases).
See supra note 21. Since hard minerals are not migratory in nature, there is no
threat of reserve depletion by operations on adjacent tracts. See supra note I.
" See, e.g., H. B. Stanley, Inc., No. 82-0050 at 2. The limestone leases had a
primary term of 5 years and provided for combined minimum royalty of $15,000 the
first year and $8,500 in subsequent years. Both parties agreed that an adjacent quarry
monopolized the market; thus, development of the property would not be economically
viable.
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sentation, the intent and expectations of the parties must deter-
mine whether a duty to develop a hard mineral lease should be
imposed on a lessee . 6 However, the intentions of the parties
cannot always be easily discerned in a mineral lease when both
minimum and production royalties are specified and no express
terms concerning development exist.8 7 The best rules of analysis
that courts can apply under these circumstances are flexible, not
hard and fast, so that all surrounding circumstances are consid-
ered to ensure a reasonable determination of the original parties'
intentions. An equitable rule of interpretation will avoid a wind-
fall profit to the lessor and prevent the lessee from tying up a
property perpetually by the payment of inadequate considera-
tion.
The "substantial relation" test followed in several
jurisdictions8 affords the opportunity to ascertain the expecta-
tions of the original parties, thus maintaining the benefits of the
bargain. Since the court examines the sufficiency of the consid-
eration at the time of the grant, freedom of contract principles
are preserved; yet the lessee is unable to speculate for a long
period for mere token consideration. If a lessee bargains for the
right to delay development by paying a relatively substantial
minimum royalty, a covenant to diligently develop is not implied.
The period of the primary term can be considered in determining
the substantialness of the minimum rent or royalty. Courts can
reasonably decide that only a very large minimum or advance
royalty is substantial enough to hold open a "no term" lease 9
where the total expected production royalties are in the millions
of dollars. Nevertheless, the intentions of the parties could be
perceived as anticipating mining delays where minimum rents
are not large if a primary term of only a few years is stipulated.
The "substantial relation" test can also account for the type
See supra note 17.
Old leases which were executed near the turn of the century between parties
now deceased can be especially ambiguous. Also, the sufficiency of payments is difficult
to evaluate in old leases due to the effects of inflation over the years. What was
substantial in 1920 may seem miniscule by today's standards.
"1 See cases cited supra note 41.
99 In Cleghorn the appellate court used a similar analysis in deciding that a "no
term" lease must be mined within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court of Texas
reversed the decision stating that an express provision ruled. Cleghorn, 611 S.W.2d at
896-97, rev'd,,623 S.W.2d 310.
HARD MINERAL LEASE COVENANTS
of minimum rent or royalty. 90 Even if the entire minimum roy-
alty is credited against all future royalties, diligent development
may not have been within the contemplation of the parties if
the lessor receives a relatively high percentage of total expected
revenues through minimum royalties within the primary term.9'
Although the parties are likely to include an express development
provision in a modern lease of this nature, the test is sufficiently
flexible to arrive at a reasonable determination of the parties'
intent under a lease so worded.
In an "or" type lease which stipulates that the lessee is
obligated to produce at a certain capacity or pay minimum
rentals, the terms of the lease do not always specify the condi-
tions and extent of delay that the parties may have contem-
plated. 92 Although clear express development provisions should
not be judicially altered by the courts, 93 the substantial relation
test can reasonably resolve any ambiguities when mining is de-
layed for an allegedly improper reason or period of time. A
token or inadequate minimum royalty will not automatically
preclude the implication of a covenant to diligently develop the
leasehold in an "or" type lease under these circumstances.
IV. ANALYSIS: DEMAND FOR DEVELOPMENT RULE
The primary purpose of the various tests applied within the
mining jurisdictions in this country is to ascertain the intent and
expectations of the parties at the time of the grant so that the
benefits of the bargain may be preserved.94 This also is true in
leases that do not provide for minimum royalties. 95 The demand
11 Higginbottom, 304 S.E.2d at 367 (the court examined both the type of minimum
royalty and its magnitude); see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
11 Possibly, a lessor may bargain for this type of royalty arrangement if the ore
deposit is only marginally profitable and it is concerned that mining may never be
conducted.
'2 The lease may not establish what type of delays were intended to be covered by
the "mine or pay" option. Mining may be delayed for several reasons, some of which
seem more justifiable than others. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 23.
- See supra note 17.
"' If a mineral lease only provides for production royalties and is silent regarding
development, courts hold that the parties obviously contemplated the property would be
diligently developed. Otherwise, the lessor may never receive any compensation for the
valuable rights it granted to the lessee. See supra notes 3 and 20.
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for development rule recently applied in Kentucky disregards the
intent of the parties and implies an obligation on the lessee to
develop the property within a year of valid notice.9 If the lease
terms do not establish development standards, the rule is appar-
ently invoked without considering the type or amount of mini-
mum royalty, 97 the length of the primary period, 9 or the market
demand for the mineral.9 Whether it is economically prudent to
develop the property within one year after receiving notice is
not considered by the court. The obligation invoked is to de-
velop, not to diligently develop as would a reasonable opera-
tor. 0
The demand for development rule has many flaws. First, tht
rule does not attempt to honor the intentions of the parties that
were the basis of the bargain. Even if the minimum royalty
payments are determined to be sufficient consideration for the
right to delay development, 0 the duty to develop is imposed
after proper notice. The one year grace period is insufficient in
a highly regulated hard mineral industry such as exists today. 02
Implementation of the rule may often result in windfall profit
to the lessor who receives all minimum royalties paid to date,
retains the mineral, and will probably re-lease to the same or
another company. Clearly, the rule provides a conducive envi-
ronment for bad faith bargaining and even fraud.'0 3
- H. B. Stanley, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 82-0050 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26,
1985); L. E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
" See H. B. Stanley, Inc., No. 82-0050 at 2 (The Baker lease provided for minimum
advance royalties of $12,500 the first year and $6,000 per year thereafter while the
Turner lease provided for minimum advance royalties of $2,500 per year.); L. E. Cooke
Corp., 549 S.W.2d at 838 ($1 per acre per year minimum royalty).
- See H. B. Stanley, Inc., No. 82-0050 at 2 (Both the Baker and Turner leases
had primary terms of five years with a right to renew the lease for five additional five
year periods; the lessors demanded development approximately eight years after the
leases were executed.); L. E. Cooke, Corp., 549 S.W.2d at 838 (leases were to remain
in effect for one year and thereafter until the lessee gave notice of its intention to cancel;
lessor filed action at the end of the first year).
See H. B. Stanley, Inc., No. 82-0050 at 3.
' See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
L. E. Cooke, Corp., 549 S.W.2d at 838 (The court found that $1 per acre per
year was sufficient consideration to delay the obligation to develop until the lessor so
demanded.).
See supra note 34.
A single lessor could potentially block the development of a large surface or
underground mine which is being planned if it is capable of invoking the demand for
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The public policy argument that valuable mineral deposits
need to be developed is insufficient justification for the demand
for development rule. Supply and demand regulate the devel-
opment rate of minerals, and production levels will not be sig-
nificantly influenced by a rule such as this. The demand for
development rule had merit in the unregulated heyday of oil and
gas as protection against migratory depletion by adjacent wells.'°4
When applied to hard mineral leases, however, the rule is ine-
quitable and contrary to established principles of contract con-
struction. 05
CONCLUSION
Every undeveloped hard mineral lease which does not contain
provisions delineating development expectations or requirements
is subject to attack for breach of an implied covenant to dili-
gently mine. Mineral attorneys must be knowledgeable of the
interpretive rules followed in their jurisdictions to ascertain
whether leases held by their clients are under significant threat
of forfeiture. This knowledge is essential for proper drafting of
the mineral leases.
The interpretive tests applied by courts vary in approach as
well as in their effectiveness for determining the original inten-
tions of the parties. The "substantial relation" test used in
several jurisdictions is a flexible tool that reasonably ascertains
the original expectations of the parties concerning development
in leases providing for minimum royalties. The test fairly takes
all external circumstances into consideration in determining
whether the right to delay development was bargained for under
the instrument. The rigid "demand for development rule" is not
justifiable as it disregards any evidence of the parties' intentions
and can result in an inequitable windfall to the lessor. The highly
development rule. For example, a large mountaintop removal coal mine often takes
years to plan and engineer before permits can even be submitted. Numerous tracts must
frequently be leased to provide sufficient coal removal and overburden storage areas
before the necessary capital can be risked. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
The lessee may be unable to prove it proceeded diligently under these circumstances
especially since the profitability of mining does not appear to be considered under the
rule. See supra note 99.
See supra note 79-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17 and 23 and accompanying text.
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regulated and complex economic environment of today's mining
industry forces prudent mining companies to delay mine devel-
opment on leased tracts in many instances. Any rule adopted by
courts for construing development requirements under leases
which provide for minimum royalties should consider all factors
that are indicative of the original parties' expectations. The
''substantial relation" test meets these needs; the "demand for
development rule" does not.
JACK C. BENDER
